

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 SANA 02164 061815Z

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ACTION NEA-07

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R 060820Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY SANA

TO SXCSTATE WASHDC 6109

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USUN NEW YORK 104

RUD BA/CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SANA 2164

LIMDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, YS, YE

XJBJECT: US POLICY TOWARD -GULF SECURITY"

REF: ABU DHABI 1581

1. SUMMARY: FROM YAR PERSPECTIVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO  
RGIE ANY COMIDEASTFOR WITHDRAWAL TO REDUCTION OF SOVIET  
PRESENCE IN ADEN AND IRAQ AND POSSIBLY TO BROAD FORMS OF  
REGIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION. FOLLOW-ON NAVAL PRESENCE IS  
NEEDED IN ANY CASE.

2. QUESTION OF WHEN AND HOW WE MIGHT ACCEDE TO GROWING PRESSURES  
TO AGREE TO A TERMINAL DATE FOR COMIDEASTFOR IS NOT LIKELY TO  
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PAGE 02 SANA 02164 061815Z

BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY SITUATION IN YAR, BUT IT IS WORTH NOTING

THAT PERSPECTIVE HERE IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN THAT EXPRESSED IN REFTEL.

3. GULF STATES MAY BE ABLE TO POINT CONFIDENTLY TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND SOLUTION OF LOCAL PROBLEMS BUT YEMENI LEADERS ARE NOT RPT NOT SO SANGUINE. THEY SEE SOMALIA, PDRY, ETRITREANS AS RADICAL CABAL WHICH, DESPITE LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG THEM, MAKES YARG ODD MAN OUT AT LOWER END OF RED SEA. PDRY IS OF COURSE MAIN THREAT, AND INCIDENTS IN SOUTHERN PART OF YAR INCLUDE SABOTAGE, POLITICAL AGITATION AND ASSASSINATION. DHOFAR AND YAR/PDRY BORDER ARE ONLY SHOOTING CONFLICTS IN PENINSULA. YARG LEADER VIEW THEIR SECURITY PROBLEM IN SOUTH AS ACTIVE AND WORRISOME. IT HAS HAD IRAQI BACKING IN PAST, AND YEMENIS ARE VERY CAUTIOUS THAT IRAQI RAPPROACHMENT WITH IRAN WILL LAST LONG OR BE AS BROAD AS SEEMS TO BE THE CASE AT PRESENT. YEMENIS REMEMBER THAT YARG LEADER MOHAMMED NUMAN WAS KILLED IN BEIRUT WHILE HE WAS ON MISSION TO MAKE KNOWN DOCUMENTS DETAILING IRAQI EFFORT IN COUP ATTEMPT HERE. EVEN IF IRAQIS REMAIN AS QUIESCENT AS NOW THE CASE, LIBYANS APPEAR PREPARED TO PUT MONEY INTO EFFORT TO MAINTAIN PDRY AS BASTION OF REJECTIONIST AND RADICAL ARAB NATIONALISM. FINALLY, EVEN THOUGH YARG MOVING TO REDUCE OR EVEN ELIMINATE SOVIET POSITION IN YEMEN, THEY ARE SCEPTICAL OF SAUDI, EGYPTIAN AND OTHER ARAB EFFORTS TO GET PDRY TO FOLLOW SUIT. SOVIETS COULD, IN FACT, UP ANTE IN SOUTH YEMEN TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE PENINSULA POSITION.

4. YEMENIS HAVE TOLD MEMBERS OF THIS MISSION THAT COMIDEASTFOR, THOUGH DISTANT AND SMALL, IS SOME BALANCE FOR SOVIET PRESENCE IN AREA. YARG ISN'T GOING PUBLICLY TO STEP OUT OF ARAB RANKS ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THEY WOULD PREFER NOT TO SEE US QUIETLY ACCEDE TO TERMINATION IF THAT LEAVE SOVIET PRESENCE WITH ONLY INFREQUENT AND LIMITED DEPLOYMENTS FROM MEDITERRANIAN OR WESTPAC. YEMENI EXPERIENCE WITH TOUGH-MINDED SOVIETS IS THAT OUR GRACEFUL WITHDRAWAL IN BAHRAIN, IN ITSELF, WOULDN'T CREATE ANY PRESSURES FOR RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL THAT RUSSIANS COULDN'T HAPPILY LIVE WITH.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SANA 02164 061815Z

5. IF WE DECIDED THAT WE HAD LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO LEAVE BAHRAIN, WE MIGHT BE ABLE, HOWEVER, TO APPROACH ARAB STATES IN GULF TO SEEK THEM MOUNT CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO PRESS PDRY TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE SOVIET MILITARY ACCESS TO ADEN. THIS WOULD TIE INTO SIMILAR EFFORTS OF EGYPTIANS AND SAUDIS AND GIVE PDRY A GOOD EXCUSE FOR ACTING.

6. ANOTHER IDEA, WHICH AGAIN OFFERED FROM YEMEN PERSPECTIVE

IS TO TIE OUR WITHDRAWAL TO SOME KIND OF GULF REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WHICH INCLUDES YEMEN AND SOUTH YEMEN. WHILE YEMENIS WON'T TAKE INITIATIVE ON BEHALF OF GULF PACT THEY WANT TO BE PART OF ANY ARRANGEMENT THAT EVOLVES. OBVIOUSLY THIS RAISES GULF ISSUES BEYOND THE PURVIEW OF THIS EMBASSY, BUT LONG RANGE GOAL OF OURSELVES AND SAUDIS AND IRANIANS PRESUMABLY INCLUDES DESIRE TO SEE PDRY ABANDON EVEN TITULAR ROLE AS SUPPORTER OF REVOLUTION IN GULF AND LOWER PENINSULA. IT WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR PDRY TO MAKE THIS TRANSITION IF IT COULD JOIN IN PENINSULA ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD ITSELF CLAIM TO BE TAKING ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE AWAY FROM FOREIGN POWERS.

7. FINALLY, IF WE AGREE TO LEAVE BAHRAIN, WE SHOULD BE PLANNING FOR OTHER FORMS OF NAVAL PRESENCE. COMIDEASTFOR WAS OFTEN DEFENDED AS SMALL AND UNOBTRUSIVE FORCE, BUT IN FACT THAT IS ITS PROBLEM. EVEN FOR EVACUATION FORCE HAS VERY LIMITED VALUE. FOLLOW-ON NAVAL PRESENCE SHOULD NOT ONLY BE LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT ITSELF INDEPENDENTLY OF ENTRAMMELLING HOME PORT FACILITY IN ARAB STATE AND SHOULD BE SCALED TO CORRESPOND WITH OUR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. IT WOULD CERTAINLY EASE YEMENI ANXIETIES ABOUT WHETHER MODERATE ARABS AND US ARE WAVE OF FUTURE, OR WHETHER RADICAL ARABS AND SOVIETS WILL RETAIN POWER TO UNDERMINE SECURITY.

8. ONLY PROBLEM IS THAT FIRST HODEIDA LIBERTY FOR NUCLEAR CARRIER IS SOMEWHAT DAUNTING PROSPECT FOR AMEMBASSY SANA. RANSOM

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